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Basic Geometry of Voting

Basic Geometry of Voting Paperback / softback - 1995 - 1995th Edition

by Donald G. Saari

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  • Paperback

Description

Paperback / softback. New. Dieses Buch beschaftigt sich mit Abstimmungsregeln bei Mehrpersonenentscheidungen. Es wird eine geometrische Theorie entwickelt, die zahlreiche neue Ergebnisse enthalt und neue Einsichten in ein Gebiet bietet, das in der Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Politikwissenschaft von grosser Bedeutung ist.
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Details

  • Title Basic Geometry of Voting
  • Author Donald G. Saari
  • Binding Paperback / softback
  • Edition number 1995th
  • Edition 1995
  • Condition New
  • Pages 300
  • Volumes 1
  • Language ENG
  • Publisher Springer, US
  • Date 1995-09-18
  • Illustrated Yes
  • Features Illustrated
  • Bookseller's Inventory # B9783540600640
  • ISBN 9783540600640 / 3540600647
  • Weight 1.05 lbs (0.48 kg)
  • Dimensions 9.27 x 6.12 x 0.76 in (23.55 x 15.54 x 1.93 cm)
  • Library of Congress Catalog Number 95031111
  • Dewey Decimal Code 324.015

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From the publisher

A surprise is how the complexities of voting theory can be explained and resolved with the comfortable geometry of our three-dimensional world. This book is directed toward students and others wishing to learn about voting, experts will discover previously unpublished results. As an example, a new profile decomposition quickly resolves two centuries old controversies of Condorcet and Borda, demonstrates, that the rankings of pairwise and other methods differ because they rely on different information, casts series doubt on the reliability of a Condorcet winner as a standard for the field, makes the famous Arrow s Theorem predictable, and simplifies the construction of examples. The geometry unifies seemingly disparate topics as manipulation, monotonicity, and even the apportionment issues of the US Supreme Court.

First line

What could be easier than interpreting an election?