Economic politics: the costs of democracy. - 1995
by Keech, William R
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Details
- Title Economic politics: the costs of democracy.
- Author Keech, William R
- Binding
- Edition First edition
- Condition New
- Pages 256
- Volumes 1
- Language ENG
- Publisher Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Date 1995
- Features Bibliography
- Bookseller's Inventory # 000524
- ISBN 9780521467681 / 0521467683
- Weight 0.7 lbs (0.32 kg)
- Dimensions 8.93 x 6 x 0.67 in (22.68 x 15.24 x 1.70 cm)
- Library of Congress subjects Democracy - Economic aspects - United States, Representative government and representation
- Library of Congress Catalog Number 94011813
- Dewey Decimal Code 338.9
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From the rear cover
This book raises and addresses questions about the consequences of democratic institutions for economic performance. Do institutions of accountability inside and outside government through periodic elections produce desired results? Do they lead to manipulation of the economy over an electoral cycle, or to the pursuit of partisan goals at odds with a general societal interest? Drawing upon concrete and observable experience in the United States and occasional reference to other countries, Professor Keech suggests that there are costs of democratic procedures. But these costs are modest and bearable, and similar to the agency costs incurred whenever a principal delegates authority to an agent. Democracy does not systematically cause inferior macroeconomic policy. This inaccessible synthesis and sharp perspective on a large topical literature will be highly useful for professionals, graduate students, upper-level undergraduates, and interested citizens aiming to understand the relationship between politics and economics.
