The Final Months of the War With Japan:; Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision, An Intelligence Monograph, CSI 98-10001 Trade paperback - 1998

Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Trade paperback. Very good. Various paginations. References. Data Annex. Selected Archival Documents. Douglas J. MacEachin, the author of this monograph, was Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency from March 1993 until June 1995. He joined the CIA in 1965 and, for the next 24 years, worked mainly on research and analysis of Soviet and European security affairs. He was Director of the Office of Soviet Analysis from 1984 until March 1989, when he became Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Arms Control. Mr. MacEachin holds baccalaureate and master's degrees in economics from Miami University of Ohio. During the period 1964-65, he was a full-time member of the faculty there. Before retiring from the CIA in 1997, Mr. MacEachin was a CIA Officer-in-Residence at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is now a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School. This work examines the role of signals intelligence in U.S. military planning during the final stages of the war with Japan in 1945 -- particularly its contribution to planning for an Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland. It is not intended as an argument for or against the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. Addresses the question of whether & to what extent intelligence might have influenced the decision to drop the bomb, & the military calculus concerning an invasion of Japan as it influenced the bomb decision. Examines the intelligence that was available at the time & to weigh the role this intelligence played in the deliberations on an invasion. This monograph was produced under the auspices of CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence and the Harvard University program for Studies of Intelligence and Policy. The idea was to examine the role of signals intelligence* in US military planning during the final stages of the war with Japan in 1945--particularly its contribution to planning for an Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland. This study was not intended as an argument for or against the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. Obviously, the importance of the bomb in concluding the war was of such magnitude that it is not plausible to examine intelligence related to invasion planning without addressing the question of whether and to what extent that same intelligence might have influenced the decision to drop the bomb. It also is not plausible to argue that the military calculus concerning an invasion of Japan does not bear directly on evaluations of the bomb decision. Nonetheless, the debates and historical studies supporting or condemning the use of the bomb involve factors that go well beyond the scope of this monograph. The study's basic objective is not to pass judgment on the decisions that were made, but rather to examine the intelligence that was available at the time and to weigh the role this intelligence played or might have played in the deliberations on an invasion.