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A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation (Lipsey Lectures)
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A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation (Lipsey Lectures) Hardcover - 2008 - 1st Edition

by Ray, Debraj

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  • Title A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation (Lipsey Lectures)
  • Author Ray, Debraj
  • Binding Hardcover
  • Edition number 1st
  • Edition 1
  • Condition Used - Good
  • Pages 336
  • Volumes 1
  • Language ENG
  • Publisher Oxford University Press, USA, Oxford and New York:
  • Date 2008-01-30
  • Illustrated Yes
  • Features Bibliography, Dust Cover, Illustrated, Index, Table of Contents
  • Bookseller's Inventory # 019920795X.G
  • ISBN 9780199207954 / 019920795X
  • Weight 1.42 lbs (0.64 kg)
  • Dimensions 9.5 x 6.24 x 0.94 in (24.13 x 15.85 x 2.39 cm)
  • Library of Congress subjects Game theory, Coalitions
  • Library of Congress Catalog Number 2008271374
  • Dewey Decimal Code 302.14

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From the publisher

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?

Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.