Game Theory: Decisions, Interaction and Evolution (Springer Undergraduate Mathematics Series) Paperback - 2006
by James N. Webb
- Used
- Paperback
Description
Details
- Title Game Theory: Decisions, Interaction and Evolution (Springer Undergraduate Mathematics Series)
- Author James N. Webb
- Binding Paperback
- Edition INTERNATIONAL ED
- Condition Used: Good
- Pages 242
- Volumes 1
- Language ENG
- Publisher Springer, London
- Date 2006-10-31
- Illustrated Yes
- Features Bibliography, Illustrated, Index, Table of Contents
- Bookseller's Inventory # SONG1846284236
- ISBN 9781846284236 / 1846284236
- Weight 0.91 lbs (0.41 kg)
- Dimensions 9.19 x 7.12 x 0.46 in (23.34 x 18.08 x 1.17 cm)
- Library of Congress Catalog Number 2006931002
- Dewey Decimal Code 330
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From the publisher
From the rear cover
This introduction to game theory is written from a mathematical perspective. Its primary purpose is to be a first course for undergraduate students of mathematics, but it also contains material which will be of interest to advanced students or researchers in biology and economics.
The outstanding feature of the book is that it provides a unified account of three types of decision problem:
- Situations involving a single decision-maker: in which a sequence of choices is to be made in "a game against nature". This introduces the basic ideas of optimality and decision processes.
- Classical game theory: in which the interactions of two or more decision-makers are considered. This leads to the concept of the Nash equilibrium.
- Evolutionary game theory: in which the changing structure of a population of interacting decision makers is considered. This leads to the ideas of evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics.
An understanding of basic calculus and probability is assumed but no prior knowledge of game theory is required. Detailed solutions are provided for the numerous exercises.
