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Game Theory for Political Scientists Hardcover - 1994
by Morrow, James D
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Details
- Title Game Theory for Political Scientists
- Author Morrow, James D
- Binding Hardcover
- Edition 1st Edition 2nd
- Condition Used - Good
- Pages 400
- Volumes 1
- Language ENG
- Publisher Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
- Date 1994-12-19
- Features Bibliography, Glossary
- Bookseller's Inventory # 0691034303-11-1
- ISBN 9780691034300 / 0691034303
- Weight 1.65 lbs (0.75 kg)
- Dimensions 9.59 x 6.5 x 1.31 in (24.36 x 16.51 x 3.33 cm)
- Library of Congress subjects Game theory, Political science - Methodology
- Library of Congress Catalog Number 94009256
- Dewey Decimal Code 320.015
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From the rear cover
Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. This book is the first comprehensive attempt to adapt contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems (with solutions) suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to modeling problems in four areas: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques and brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.