The Neck of the Bottle: George W. Goethals and the Reorganization of the U.S. Army Supply System, 1917-1918 (Volume 27) (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series) Hardcover - 1992

George W. Goethals successfully engineered the Panama Canal, but he could not engineer a modern, rational organization for the U.S. Army, even in the face of the crisis of World War I. Despite his best efforts at centralization of the General Staff, American military logistics remained painfully chaotic, and the heads of bureaus - the so-called chiefs - proved adept at preserving their authority. At war's end, Goethals found himself with a largely paper organization, which dissolved during the confusion of demobilization. Goethals was recruited to manage the military mess that existed in 1917. He has been credited by historians with producing a virtual managerial revolution by his dramatic and drastic reorganization of the War Department's supply apparatus and combining of bureaus into a single division for purchase, storage, and traffic. But while this evaluation is not totally wrong, Phyllis A. Zimmerman concludes in this first large-scale study of his efforts, it has overestimated Goethals's contribution to order and efficiency. She demonstrates that the U.S. Army attempt to reorganize to face the requirements of twentieth-century warfare came to virtually nothing. Military historians, political scientists, and students of public administration will find this revisionist look at Goethals and his work a significant contribution to the understanding of the course of World War I, the problems of reforming military structure, the politics of the Wilson administration, and the inertia and power of resistance of bureaucracies generally.