Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board

[Washington], 1945. Softcover. Very Good. Mimeographed typescript, 7.75 x 12.25 inches, pp. vii, 54, viii, 55-241, [1], 294-304, in original plain side-stapled wrappers. Leaf between pp 241 and 294 reads: "Chapter V of this report, as well as the conclusions based there which related to Colonel Wyman, have been omitted in accordance with the statement of the Secretary of War, dated August 29, 1945." Toning and mild soiling to wrappers, rear wrapper detached but present; contents clean and sound. Advance issue of the first report on how the disaster at Pearl Harbor unfolded and why the United States was caught unprepared. The members of the Board were General George Grunert, Major Henry D. Russell, Major Walter H. Frank, Colonel Charles W. West, Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, and Major Henry C. Clausen. They were appointed to "ascertain and report facts relating to the attack made by Japanese Armed Forces upon the territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941," and much of the evidence they gathered is presented here. Among their conclusions: The attack on Pearl Harbor "was daring, well-conceived, and well-executed and caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it or to minimize its destructiveness." The extent of the disaster was due to the failure of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to alert his command for war and to the War Department for failing to keep him apprised of developments in U.S.-Japanese negotiations. The report also names serveral individuals in positions of authority and details their errors and failures, most of which relate to inadequate communication to subordinates, resulting in a failure to act and lack of preparedness.