The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model by Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David

UsedGood. We flipped through this book and didn't notice any notes or underlines. The cover has visible markings and wear. Some corner dings. Fast Shipping - Each order powers our free bookstore in Chicago and sending books to Africa!

Paperback. Very Good.

Princeton University Press, 2002-01-15. paperback. Very Good. 6x1x10. The pages are clean and unmarked. The cover has very mild bumping and is clean with the exception of two red marks on the front cover and another fainter red mark on the back cover.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Paperback. Very good. Paperback. 10" X 7". xiii, 421pp. Very mild shelf wear to covers, corners, and edges of paper wraps. Pages are clean and unmarked. Binding is sound. ABOUT THIS BOOK: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design… Read More

paperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book.

Princeton University Press, 2002. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,850grams, ISBN:9780691091846

Princeton: Princeton, 2002. kart

Paperback / softback. New. New Book; Fast Shipping from UK; Not signed; Not First Edition; Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three type

Paperback / softback. New. Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability.

Princeton Univ Pr, 2002. Paperback. New. illustrated edition. 421 pages. 10.25x6.75x1.25 inches.