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Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth (Oxford Philosophical
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Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth (Oxford Philosophical Monographs) Paperback - 2004

by Misak, C. J

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  • Title Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth (Oxford Philosophical Monographs)
  • Author Misak, C. J
  • Binding Paperback
  • Edition Expanded
  • Condition Used - Good
  • Pages 232
  • Volumes 1
  • Language ENG
  • Publisher Clarendon Press, 2004. 232p. Paperback. Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs.
  • Date 2004-05-06
  • Features Bibliography, Index
  • Bookseller's Inventory # 0199270597.G
  • ISBN 9780199270590 / 0199270597
  • Weight 0.61 lbs (0.28 kg)
  • Dimensions 8.56 x 5.38 x 0.51 in (21.74 x 13.67 x 1.30 cm)
  • Reading level 1300
  • Library of Congress subjects Truth, Peirce, Charles S
  • Library of Congress Catalog Number 2008613136
  • Dewey Decimal Code 121.092

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First line

Peirce founded pragmatism.

From the rear cover

C..S. Pierce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book Cheryl Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's text and to the requirements of a suitable account of the truth. In her account, the correspondence theory of truth is rejected, yet relativism is avoided and the principle of bivalence is preserved, albeit in unusual way.