Why Regulate Utilities?: The New Institutional Economics and the Chicago Gas Industry, 1849-1924 Hardback - 1996
by Werner Troesken
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Details
- Title Why Regulate Utilities?: The New Institutional Economics and the Chicago Gas Industry, 1849-1924
- Author Werner Troesken
- Binding Hardback
- Condition New
- Pages 152
- Volumes 1
- Language ENG
- Publisher University of Michigan Press
- Date 1996-12
- Illustrated Yes
- Features Bibliography, Illustrated, Index
- Bookseller's Inventory # A9780472107391
- ISBN 9780472107391 / 0472107399
- Weight 0.98 lbs (0.44 kg)
- Dimensions 9.29 x 6.24 x 0.72 in (23.60 x 15.85 x 1.83 cm)
- Library of Congress subjects Antitrust law - United States - History, Gas industry - Government policy - Illinois
- Library of Congress Catalog Number 96010150
- Dewey Decimal Code 363.630
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From the rear cover
Why Regulate Utilities? informs and revises economic thought about regulation and regulatory changes. Showing that state regulation governed the behavior of local politicians as well as utilities, Werner Troesken gives empirical muscle to the idea that regulatory commissions act like administered contracts. Synthesizing and extending the new institutional economics, he builds a comprehensive model of institutional change and political economy. Why Regulate Utilities? promotes sensitivity to a relevant past. Highlighting institutional arrangements once hidden by the shadows of the past, it demonstrates how utility markets operated in the years before state regulation. Emphasizing the importance of historical context, Werner Troesken suggests that producer support for a particular law or regulation need not imply that the law or regulation is inefficient or contrary to the public interest.