Strategy and Compromise; A Reappraisal of the Crucial Decisions Confronting the Allies in the Hazardous Years, 1940-1945

New York City: Little, Brown & Company, 1958. First Edition [stated], presumed first printing. Hardcover. good/fair (). v, [3], 120 pages. DJ is soiled, scuffed, several small tears and chips. Signed by the author on the front free endpaper. Note by previous owner inside front cover. Contains Preface, Footnotes, The War in Europe, The War in the Pacific, and Conclusion. This is An Atlantic Monthly Press Book. Samuel Eliot Morison (July 9, 1887 - May 15, 1976) was an American historian noted for his works of maritime history and American history that were both authoritative and popular. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1912, and taught history at the university for 40 years. He won Pulitzer Prizes for Admiral of the Ocean Sea (1942), a biography of Christopher Columbus, and John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography (1959). In 1942, he was commissioned to write a history of United States naval operations in World War II, which was published in 15 volumes between 1947 and 1962. Morison wrote the popular Oxford History of the American People (1965), and co-authored the classic textbook The Growth of the American Republic (1930) with Henry Steele Commager. Over the course of his career, Morison received eleven honorary doctoral degrees, and garnered numerous literary prizes, military honors, and national awards from both foreign countries and the United States, including two Pulitzer Prizes, two Bancroft Prizes, the Balzan Prize, the Legion of Merit, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Samuel Eliot Morison, a renowned historian and scholar, stated that the nucleus of this work was a lecture on American Naval Strategy in World War II delivered at Phillips Exeter academy in February, 1057 and that he presented the substance of this book in two lectures on "American Contributions to the Strategy of World War II'' at the University of Oxford in May, 1957. Morison revised and enlarged these lectures for this publication. Derived from a review posted on line: Morison explores the highest-level decisions and strategies involving the United States and Great Britain from 1941 to 1945. These points span both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Morison's interest hones in on, respectively, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and the handful of generals and admirals who directly worked with them. Among the most important points covered by Morison was the "Europe First" decision. He writes that in early 1941 American and British military planners concluded that should the U.S. enter the war, the primary focus of effort would be in Europe. The Asian theater-or Japanese, or Pacific, theater, if you prefer-had to wait until Europe was retaken, re-secured, and re-won from Hitler's Germany. Everything flowed from that. Despite the agreement, subsequent strategy and policy moved in different directions in Britain and America. In large part, this difference reflected the two national leaders, their personalities, and the divergent systems of decisions embedded in their national structures. These differences played out in how, when, or whether to attack enemy forces in North Africa and, later, the European continent. The disagreements mattered less in the Pacific. There, the United States wielded extensive power in formulating, deciding, and implementing strategy. Britain's role was nearly entirely supplemental, secondary, and supportive. Morison's description of the separate methods of Roosevelt and Churchill in dealing with key advisors is insightful. Chief executives in every organization have a group, team, or body of advisors with extraordinary influence on daily decisions. For Roosevelt and Churchill, two wartime leaders, these entities were their respective military chiefs of staff. The two leaders approached these groups in strikingly opposite ways: Churchill worked closely with the British Chiefs of Staff, while Roosevelt was much more aloof and distant from his American version. This separation affected decisions because it affected decision-making processes. The broader point about the Europe-First approach adopted in early 1941 is that vision needs simple, clear, and brief language-Europe First. The existence of a vision is just one part of how vision fits into leadership. Having a Europe-First vision did not translate into successful strategies by itself. Though the vision proved right, the strategies for getting there proved quite problematic. The difficulties around Operation Torch in North Africa are just one illustration. The strategies of vision are often best expressed in two categories: your strategic strengths and your competitors' strategic weaknesses. Imagine strategies from both perspectives, from both categories. The sequencing and timing are critical linkages between strategies and vision. Morison shows that American military planners debated which should come first, the seizure of the Philippines or the seizure of the Japanese islands. Both were important aspects of the Pacific Second vision, but each had a different look and feel within strategy depending on which of the two came first.