THE CANADIAN ARMY AND THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN - A Study Of Failure In High Command.

New York. Praeger. 1991. (3714) NEW Hardback. First Edition. 347 pages. Maps. B.w. illustrations. Fine in black boards with gilt lettering to spine, in a fine d.w. Unread book from new stock. A detailed historical examination of the role of the Canadian Army in Normandy and of the organisation, training, and fighting style that the Canadians brought to the battlefield in 1944. In Book One - Long Forgotten Winters - the author analyzes the impact of the British military model on the Canadian corps in terms of doctrine, training, command and staff appointments, equipment, and organization. He discusses the contribution of Canadian troops in World War I and the failure of the Canadian military to maintain a high level of professionalism in the interwar period. Drawing on archival records, he offers new information on attempts to turn poorly trained troops into an effective fighting force as late as 1943. Book Two, from pages 157 - Half-Forgotten Summer - presents a critical analysis of Canadian operations in Normandy. The author gives special attention to the Canadian Army's inability to close the 'Falaise Gap' in a timely manner - a delay that may have prolonged the war in Europe by several months. Providing both theoretical and practical perspectives on the relationship of peacetime preparation to the operation of large field forces in battle, this work will be of interest to students and buffs of military history and to professional analysts and strategic planners in the armed services. ISBN: 0-275-93019-X.